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Issues in the Third Circuit
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS
TO ADJUDICATORY HEARINGS IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT:
DOES THE ONGOING THREAT OF TERRORISM
CALL FOR A SECRET JUSTICE SYSTEM?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, in conjunction with the Fourteenth, prohibits governments from "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."' This language offers little guidance to
courts as they determine how much protection to afford the press's
2
unique role of investigating, criticizing and reporting public affairs. Despite the First Amendment's lack of guidance, courts agree that at the very
least it ensures freedom of communication on matters relating to the function of government.

3

An important question arises when civil liberties such as freedom of
speech and press clash with the government's interest in national security.
Courts have addressed this clash throughout history by fashioning legal
rules aimed at striking a balance between civil liberties and national security. 4 The savage events of September 11, 2001 raised questions about the
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

2. See id. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances."). Although the First Amendment
does not explicitly grant a right of access to certain government information, the
Supreme Court has construed the First Amendment broadly to include those
rights that are "necessary to the enjoyment of other First Amendment rights."
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (discussing
unenumerated rights encompassed by First Amendment).
3. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966) (emphasizing major purpose of First Amendment, which is to protect free discussion of governmental affairs); see also Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604 (interpreting First Amendment to
"ensure that the individual citizen can effectively participate in and contribute to
our republican system of self-government").
4. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165 (1963) (stressing
that indispensable necessity to observe constitutional rights "under the gravest of
emergencies has existed throughout our constitutional history [because] the pressing exigencies of crisis [present] the greatest temptation to dispense with fundamental constitutional guarantees which, it is feared, will inhibit governmental
action"). Indeed, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the Constitution protects the recognized liberties of "all classes of men ... under all circumstances," in
times of war and peace. SeeExparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 120-21, 124 (1866) ("[I]f
society is disturbed by civil commotion-if the passions of men are aroused and
the restraints of law weakened, if not disregarded-these safeguards need, and

(1303)
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extent to which courts would afford more weight to national security interests than to liberty interests. 5 As one court predicted, the government's
response to the September 11, 2001 attacks "will test our ability to balance
national interests with the nation's profound reverence for order and freedom and its enduring defense of individual liberties." 6 An important issue
calling for such a balance is whether courts should curtail the press's First
Amendment right to access certain governmental proceedings in order to
7
accommodate the government's war on terrorism.
This Casebrief explores the development of the press's First Amendment right of access to governmental proceedings in the Third Circuit.
Specifically, this Casebrief examines the press's right to attend various
types of adjudicatory hearings, ranging from criminal and civil trials to
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) deportation proceedings
that involve resident aliens whom the Attorney General has determined
might be connected with al Qaeda or have information concerning the
September 11, 2001 attacks. 8 To provide background for the Third Cirshould receive, the watchful care of those entrusted with the guardianship of the
Constitution and laws.").
5. See United States v. Harrell, 207 F. Supp. 2d 158, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (recognizing colossal challenges courts will face as United States government combats
unique threats it has encountered in wake of terrorist attacks committed on American soil).
6. United States v. AI-Marri, 230 F. Supp. 2d 535, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing
Harrell,207 F. Supp. 2d at 161-62); see also Adam Liptak, Neil A. Lewis & Benjamin
Weiser, After Sept. 11, a Legal Battle on the Limits of Civil Liberty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4,
2002, at Al, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/wtc/liberties/ 2002/0804battles.htm (discussing how government's vow to hunt down and punish terrorists has
begun to "redefine the delicate balance between individual liberties and national
security").
7. See, e.g., N.Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 199 (3d Cir.
2002) (addressing issue of whether media has right of access to deportation hearings that involve prospective deportees whom Attorney General Ashcroft has stated
might have information concerning September 11, 2001 attacks or connections to
al Qaeda or other terrorist groups threatening United States interests); Detroit
Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 705-07 (6th Cir. 2002) (dealing with issue of
whether government's interest in national security is sufficiently compelling to outweigh public's and press's First Amendment right of access to INS deportation
hearings); Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 215 F. Supp.
2d 94, 111 (D.D.C. 2002) (determining whether certain public interest groups
were entitled to ascertain names of persons apprehended in connection with investigation of major terrorist event, as well as dates and locations of persons' arrest,
detention and release); United States v. Lindh, 198 F. Supp. 2d 739, 741-42 (E.D.
Va. 2002) (acknowledging need to weigh interest in protecting information vital to
national security against impact such protection might have on public and press's
First Amendment right of access, which may be abridged only in limited circumstances); United States v. Moussaoui, 2002 WL 1987964, at *1 (E.D. Va. 2002) (denying Court TV's argument that press's right of access to criminal trials requires
court to allow Court TV to photograph and videotape proceedings, given that case
involved allegations of al Qaeda conspiracy whose members may monitor trial proceedings involving its members).
8. For recent accounts of deportation hearings conducted in secret, see generally Letter from Congress to Attorney GeneralJohn Ashcroft (June 21, 2002) (on
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cuit's approach, Part II describes the leading United States Supreme Court
cases addressing the media's First Amendment right to attend criminal
proceedings. 9 Part III then considers the Third Circuit's treatment of the
media's right of access and, particularly, how the Third Circuit has expanded the scope of that right."' Part IV analyzes the Third and Sixth
Circuits' contrasting decisions regarding the press's right of access to "special interest" INS deportation hearings.'I Finally, Part V summarizes the
issues discussed in this Casebrief and considers the impact of the Third
12
Circuit's approach on practitioners.
II.

A.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRESS'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF
ACCESS TO GOVERNMENTAL PROCEEDINGS

Richmond Newspapers: The Supreme Court Establishes a Right of Access
to Criminal Trials

The Supreme Court initially interpreted the First Amendment guarantees of free speech and press to embody a right to attend criminal trials
in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.13 Richmond Newspapers involved a

third retrial of a defendant for murder. 14 The defendant convinced the
file with author), available at www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/020621ashcroft.pdf.
(admonishing Department ofJustice's (DOJ's) blanket policy of secret arrests and
detentions as not having "withstood public, congressional, and, now, judicial scrutiny" and warning DOJ that it "risks handing the terrorists a victory, if, as it works to
prevent terrorism, it cedes a commitment to fundamental constitutional
principles").
9. For a discussion of Supreme Court cases establishing and applying the First
Amendment right of access, see infra notes 13-43 and accompanying text.
10. For an examination of how the Third Circuit has broadened the scope of
the public and press's right of access, see infra notes 47-66 and accompanying text.
11. For an analysis of the Third and Sixth Circuits' approaches to the question of whether the public and press have a right of access to special interest deportation hearings, see infra notes 83-128 and accompanying text.
12. For a brief summary of the issues discussed in the Casebrief and implications of how the Third Circuit has dealt with the First Amendment right of access,
see infra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
13. 448 U.S. 555, 564 (1980) (plurality opinion). The Supreme Court was
asked for the first time to decide whether the press can be excluded from criminal
trials. See id. (stating issue presented) Prior to Richmond Newspapers, the Court dealt
with the issue of whether a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial required that the press and the public have a right to attend a pre-trial
suppression hearing. See Gannett v. Depasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1979)
(holding Sixth Amendment right to public trial belongs to criminal defendant, not
public or press).
14. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 559 (stating facts). In Richmond Newspapers, a criminal defendant, Stevenson, was on trial for fatally stabbing a hotel
manager. See id. (same). Stevenson was convicted for murder, but the Virginia
Supreme Court reversed his conviction after finding that the conviction was based
on improperly admitted evidence. See id. (same). Subsequently, a newspaper article reported that the key piece of evidence excluded from the Stevenson's trial was
a bloodstained shirt obtained from his wife shortly after the killing. See id. at 559
n.1 (same). Two mistrials ensued, apparently because some of the jurors were
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trial judge to exclude the press from his trial by asserting that the press's
presence tainted the jury's impartiality. 15 Upon granting certiorari, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that the press has a fundamental right to
attend criminal trials. 16 Having found that the right to attend criminal
trials is grounded in the First Amendment, the Court declared that a government actor may close courtroom doors to the press only upon showing
that it has a compelling interest and that the particular closure order is
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.17
Justice Brennan, in his highly precedential concurrence, provided
two main justifications for holding that the First Amendment implicitly
guarantees the press a right to attend criminal trials.' 8 The firstjustificabiased against the defendant after having read the news article regarding the
bloodstained shirt. See id. at 559 (same).
15. See id. at 561 (stating facts). The trial judge ordered the reporters to leave
the courtroom and the reporters sued to vacate the order, asserting a First Amendment right to attend the trial. See id. (same). After several appeals, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the trial judge's closure order. See id. at 581 (concluding trial judge's failure to articulate findings about
interest that could rebut presumptive openness of criminal trial required reversal).
16. See id. at 580. ("We hold that the right to attend criminal trials is implicit
in the guarantees of the First Amendment; without freedom to attend such trials ... important aspects of freedom of speech and 'of the press could be eviscerated."' (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972))). Although there
was no majority opinion in Richmond Newspapers, seven Justices signed on to the
notion that the express guarantees of the First Amendment embody a fundamental right of access to criminal trials. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,
457 U.S. 596, 603 (1982) (instructing that despite plurality opinion in Richmond
Newspapers, that case "firmly established for the first time that the press and general
public have a constitutional right of access to criminal trials").
In Richmond Newspapers, as in almost any case where the press or individual
appeals a trial judge's closure order, the challenger's argument on appeal is moot
because the proceeding to which it unsuccessfully sought access will likely have
ended by the time the challenger has appealed. See id. at 563 (commenting on fact
that criminal trial to which reporters sought attendance has long since ended, and
state suggests reporters' case is moot). The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that a court does not lack jurisdiction simply because a contest is short-lived.
See S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911) (stating that if underlying
dispute is "capable of repetition, yet evading review," it is not moot). The Supreme
Court in Richmond Newspapers recognized that when a challenger asserts a right of
access to a proceeding, a court's jurisdiction over the challenger's case will not be
defeated because the case falls within the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to the mootness rule. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 563.
17. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580-81 (concluding trial judge provided inadequate justification for closing Stevenson's trial to Richmond Newspaper reporters). The Court further stated, "[a]bsent an overriding interest
articulated in specific findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the
public." Id.; see also Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606-07 (1982) (cautioning that
where State attempts to close courtroom doors to public and press in order to
prevent disclosure of sensitive information, State "must show that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest").
18. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 574 n.9. (Brennan, J., concurring)
(commenting on fact that presumption of openness was so solidly grounded in
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tion was historical: criminal trials in the United States and England have
been open to all who care to observe since before the Norman Conquest. 19 The second justification was based on logic. 2 0 Specifically, the
Court recognized that openness is an indispensable characteristic of an
Anglo-American trial because the public's presence ensures that the pro21
ceedings are conducted fairly for all involved.
To further define its logic justification, the Court articulated three
reasons why access to criminal trials enhances the functioning of the justice system. 22 First, public access to criminal proceedings safeguards the
defendant's due process rights. 23 Second, it discourages perjury, misconduct of participants and judicial decisions based on prejudice, secret bias
or partiality. 24 Third, the history of open trials reflects the acknowledgment that public trials have a prophylactic value for the community in that
public trials soothe human reactions of outrage to injustice and prevent
25
self-help by vigilantes.
The Court's right-of-access analysis boils down to two questions: (1)
Has the proceeding in question been historically open to the public? (2)
Does public access play a positive role in the functioning of a criminal
trial? 26 These two questions have been coined as the history and logic
history of United States that Court was unable to find single instance of criminal
trial conducted in camera in any federal, state or municipal court).
19. See id. at 592 (Brennan,J., concurring) (recognizing importance of public
access to court proceedings because access is one of numerous checks and balances of our free and democratic system of government).
20. See id. at 593-97 (gleaning from history several justifications in support
open criminal trials). The Court noted the unimportance of whether it characterized the right to hear, see and communicate observations concerning criminal trials as a "right of access" or a "right to gather information" because "[the Court
has] recognized that without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of
the press could be eviscerated." Id.
21. See id. at 593-94 (concluding that open trials ensure defendants fair determinations of guilt or innocence and that justice is afforded equally).
22. For further discussion of why public scrutiny of trials enhances the functioning of the justice system, see infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
23. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982)
(instructing that public scrutiny of criminal trials safeguards defendants' rights).
24. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) ("In addition to ensuring
that judge and prosecutor carry out their duties responsibly, a public trial encourages witnesses to come forward and discourages perjury.").
25. See Press Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press Enter. I), 464 U.S. 501, 50809 (1984) (praising openness of trials as having "community therapeutic value" in
that community's witnessing of trials pacifies community's urge to retaliate against
criminals); see also Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571 (explaining effect of public
being aware criminals have been convicted and punished is to restore imbalance
created by offenses-imbalances that may have otherwise been restored by committees with their own sense of mobjustice). As noted by the Court, the essential
therapeutic value of the administration of justice cannot function in the dark; no
community catharsis can occur ifjustice is "done in a corner or in any covert manner." See id. (quoting SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 188 (R. Perry ed. 1959)).
26. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 588-89 (Brennan,J., concurring) (instructing courts to consider whether proceeding in question has been open
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prongs of the Richmond Newspapers analysis. 2 7 This two-prong test has become central to any inquiry into whether the press has a right of access to
2
an adjudicatory hearing.

B.

The Supreme Court Expands the Right of Access to Non-Trial Phases of
Criminal Proceedings

Although Richmond Newspapers only established a right of access to
criminal trials, subsequent Supreme Court decisions have extended the
right to pre- and post-trial criminal proceedings.2 9 In Press-EnterpriseCo. v.
Superior Court ("Press-Enterprise lr'),3o)
the Court found that the press had a
right to attend jury voir dire examinations in a criminal trial that involved
the rape and murder of a teenage girl. 3 1 The State opposed opening the
proceeding to the media, arguing that its presence would discourage jurors from candidly responding to questions and, consequently, would prevent the defendant from receiving a trial by an impartial jury. 32 Applying
throughout history and noting that "what is crucial in individual cases is whether
access to a particular government process is important in terms of that very process"). In a precedential concurring opinion, Justice Brennan propounded the
fundamental reason for conducting trials in the public eye. See id. at 597 ("The
First Amendment embodies more than a commitment to free expression ... it has
a structural role to play in securing and fostering our republican system of selfgovernment." (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803))). He explained that the right of access reflects the special nature of a claim of First
Amendment right to gather information. See id. at 599-600 (characterizing trial
courtrooms as places where press and public "are not only free to be, but where
their presence serves to assure the integrity of what goes on").
27. See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606 ("[T]he institutional value of the open
criminal trial is recognized in both experience [history] and logic." (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 570-71 )). In Globe Newspaper, the Court voided a Massachusetts law requiring that the press and public be excluded from a courtroom
during the testimony of a minor who was allegedly the victim of a sex crime. See id.
at 610-11 (concluding that Massachusetts law violated First Amendment right of
access). The Globe Newspaper Court confirmed the reasoning in Richmond Newspapers stating, "public scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards
the integrity of the fact-finding process, with benefits to both the defendant and to
society as a whole." Id. at 606.
28. For further discussion of how Richmond Newspapers history and logic analysis has become an integral part of right of access determinations, see infra notes
29-136 and accompanying text.
29. For further discussion of Supreme Court cases expanding the scope of the
right of access, see infra notes 30-43 and accompanying text.
30. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
31. See id. at 511 (concluding guarantees of public proceedings in criminal
trials cover proceedings in voir dire examinations of potential jurors). The defendant in Press-EnterpriseIwas tried and convicted and sentenced to death for raping
and murdering a teenage girl. See id. at 503 (stating facts). Before the voir dire
examination of prospective jurors commenced, reporters from Press-Enterprise
Co. argued that the voir dire be open to the public and press, asserting a right to
attend trial under Richmond Newspapers and that the trial commenced with the voir
dire proceedings. See id. (same).
32. See id. (stating facts). The trial judge closed all but three days of the sixweek voir dire proceeding to the public. See id. at 503 (same). After the trial oc-
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the history and logic analysis of Richmond Newspapers, the Court explained
that voir dire proceedings had been open to the public for centuries before
the Colonies separated from England. 33 Additionally, the Court stated
that public access enhances the functioning of voir dire examinations by
protecting individuals against arbitrary government action and safeguard34
ing defendants' rights.
The Supreme Court similarly used the Richmond Newspapers analysis to
extend the press's right of access to preliminary hearings of a criminal
trial.3 5 In Press-EnterpriseCo. v. Superior Court ("Press-EnterpriseIf'),36 the
Court declared that the press has a right to attend a preliminary proceeding.3 7 The Press-EnterpriseII decision contributed to right-of-access doctrine by instructing that the question of whether the press has a First
Amendment right of access "cannot be resolved solely on the label we give
the event, i.e., 'trial' or otherwise, particularly where the preliminary hear38
ing functions much like a full-scale trial."
curred, the press unsuccessfully sought access to the transcripts of the voir dire
proceedings. See id. (same). The Supreme Court ultimately granted certiorari and
reversed and remanded, ordering the non-sensitive information in the transcripts
to be disclosed to the press. See id. at 513 (emphasizing that transcript of proceeding did not contain much privacy-sensitive information).
33. See id. at 508 (explaining history of public jury selection, which, as Court
noted, was common practice in America at time Constitution was adopted).
34. See id. at 508 (illustrating how public access to trials enhances fairness and
appearance of fairness, which maintains public confidence in justice system).
Therefore, the Court found that the press had a right of access to the voir dire
proceedings for two reasons: (1) the trial judge provided no findings showing that
an open proceeding would threaten either the accused's interest in a trial by an
impartial jury or jurors' privacy interests; and (2) even with findings adequate to
support closure, the judge failed to consider whether alternatives were available to
protect the interests of the prospective jurors, such as limiting closure to information that was sufficiently sensitive to deserve privacy protection. See id. at 510-11
(suggesting that trial judge's closure of proceeding failed strict scrutiny).
35. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enter. II), 478 U.S. 1, 13
(1986) (extending fight of access to transcripts of preliminary hearing in criminal
case, over objections of judge, prosecutor and defendant, all of whom thought
public access to transcripts would endanger fair trial).
36. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
37. See id. at 12 (finding public access to preliminary hearing no less essential
to proper functioning of preliminary proceeding than of trial itself). In Press-Enterprise II, a magistrate closed the defendant's preliminary hearing because the case
had attracted national attention and "only one side may get reported in the media." Id. at 4. The defendant's case attracted national attention because defendant was a nurse charged with murdering twelve patients by administering to them
massive doses of the heart drug lidocaine. See id. at 3 (stating facts).
38. Id. at 7 If, as the Court stated, a right of access is not solely determined by
whether the event is an actual trial, one can reasonably infer that a right of access
is largely determined by whether the proceeding in question has a history of openness and whether public access plays a positive role in the functioning of the proceeding. See generally Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 701 (6th Cir.
2002) (applying history and logic prongs of right-of-access analysis to special interest INS deportation hearing).
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Several elements of the reasoning in Press-EnterpriseII are particularly
noteworthy. 39 First, the Court substantiated the history prong of Richmond
Newspapers, determining that a two-hundred-year period of presumptive
openness advises that a particular proceeding should be conducted in the
public eye. 4 0 Second, the Court suggested that the importance of public

access to a proceeding could counterbalance a brief history of openness,
hinting that the analysis should be applied as a sliding scale test. 4 I Third,
the Court emphasized that a preliminary hearing occurs before a judicial
officer without a jury, which has long been recognized as a safeguard
against overzealous prosecutors and biased judges.4 2 Moreover, the Court
proclaimed, in the absence of a jury, public access plays a vital role in
promoting fairness of non-jury proceedings in that only the press and public can perform the jury's function of safeguarding the defendant's
rights.
III.

43

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS IN
THE THIRD CIRCUIT

After Richmond Newspapers and its Supreme Court progeny, the open
question was whether the right of access was confined to the criminal context or whether the justifications for access applied equally to non-criminal
contexts. 44 The Third Circuit followed the Court's lead in recognizing a
right of access to the phases of a criminal trial.4 5 Shortly thereafter, the
39. See Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. at 8 (coining two-prong Richmond Newspapers
analysis by stating, if proceeding in question passes test of experience and logic,
then press possesses qualified First Amendment right to attend proceeding).
40. See id. at 10 (citing United States v. Burr, 25 F.Cas. 1, No. 14,692
(C.C.D.Ky. 1806) as example of 196-year-old case in which preliminary hearing was
conducted before public and press). That roughly 200 years satisfies the history
prong has significant implications for later cases in determining what amount of
time is adequate to satisfy the history prong. Compare Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at
701 (finding deportation hearings to have 120-year tradition of presumptive openness sufficient to satisfy history prong), with N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 199 (3d Cir. 2002) (suggesting that deportation hearings do
not have tradition of openness tantamount to "unbroken and uncontradicted" tradition of openness present in civil and criminal trial contexts).
41. See Press-Enter.II, 478 U.S. at 10-11 n.3 (suggesting agreement with cases
that noted, "some pretrial proceedings have no historical counterpart, but, given
the importance of the pretrial proceeding to the criminal trial, the traditional
right of access should still apply").
42. See id. at 13 (emphasizing importance of public access to preliminary hearing because it is conducted without presence of jury).
43. See id. ("People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their
institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from
observing.") (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572
(1981)).
44. For a discussion of whether and how the right of access applies outside
the criminal context, see infra notes 47-128 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 835 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding
First Amendment right of access attaches to post-trial hearings to investigate jury
misconduct). Simone illustrates how the Third Circuit traditionally applied the his-
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Third Circuit created a right of access in the civil and administrative
46
contexts.

A.

Third Circuit Creates a Right of Access to Civil Proceedings

The Third Circuit first decided that the Richmond Newspapers analysis

applied to a civil trial in Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen.47 In Publicker, a
trial judge excluded a PhiladelphiaInquirer reporter from a civil hearing
because of the sensitive nature of the corporate information being considered and because the very issue before the court was whether the corporate information should be disclosed to stockholders. 48 Upon request of
Publicker's counsel, the trial judge excluded the press from the hearing,
tory and logic analysis to determine whether a right of access attaches to a particular proceeding. See id. at 837-40 (applying Richmond Newspapers test as sliding scale
test). The Simone court explained, "[t] hough experience provides little guidance,
logic counsels that access to these proceedings will in general have a positive effect." Id. at 840. The Third Circuit recognized that the majority of post-trial inquiries into jury misconduct were conducted in camera; therefore, having found no
history of openness, the court stated, "in making our determination we will rely
primarily on the logic prong of the test." Id. at 838.
The Third Circuit similarly applied the Richmond Newspapers test as a sliding
scale in United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 555 (3d Cir. 1982) (positing that
history prong was not relevant to determination of whether First Amendment right
of access applied to pretrial criminal proceedings and therefore focusing on "the
current role of the first amendment and the societal interests in open pretrial
criminal proceedings"). The court in Criden found a right of access to pretrial
criminal proceedings because the societal interests identified by the Supreme
Court as mandating a strong presumption of access to criminal trials were "also
present in the context of pretrial criminal proceedings." Id. at 556 (defining and
applying six societal interests previously articulated in Richmond Newspapers).
46. For further discussion of the Third Circuit's consideration of whether the
right of access applies to civil and administrative contexts, see infra notes 47-66 and
accompanying text.
47. 733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying Richmond Newspapers and
holding First Amendment implicitly incorporates right of access to civil trials); accord Rushford v. The New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988)
(concluding Richmond Newspapers applies and that First Amendment right exists in
civil context); Westmoreland v. CBS, 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984) (same); Matter
of Cont'l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984) (same); Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Co. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983) (same); Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 801 (11th Cir. 1983) (same). In Publicker Industries,
a prospective stockholder of Publicker Industries, Inc. sought an injunction ordering Publicker's board of directors to disclose certain corporate information to its
stockholders at its annual meeting the next day. See Publicker, 733 F.3d at 1062-63
(stating facts). The information requested concerned one of Publicker's foreign
subsidiary's processes of producing scotch. See id. at 1064 (same). The subsidiary
failed to get approval for its process from Customs and Excise as required by the
English Company Finance Act. See id. at 1065 (same). The subsidiary's lack of
requisite approval raised the danger that the scotch was produced illegally, causing
Publicker to lose millions of dollars. See id. (same).
48. See Publicker, 733 F.3d at 1063 (stating facts). During the hearing in which
the judge was to decide whether the board had to disclose the disputed information to Publicker's stockholders, a reporter for the PhiladelphiaInquirerentered the
courtroom. See id. (same).
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stating that by permitting the press to attend the hearing, "the press would
be usurping the very function that is reposed in me; namely, deciding
49
whether this information should be revealed or not."
The Third Circuit applied the two-prong Richmond Newspapers analysis
in this civil trial context.50 Applying the history prong, the court stated
that civil trials, like criminal trials, have been historically open to the press
and public. 5 I The court then applied the logic prong and concluded that
public access to the civil trial, like the criminal trial, plays an important
52
As the Third
positive role in the functioning of the judicial proceeding.
Circuit aptly stated,
Public access to civil trials, no less than criminal trials, plays an
important role in the participation and the free discussion of governmental affairs. Therefore, we hold that the "First Amendment
embraces a right of access to [civil] trials ... to ensure that this
constitutionally protected 'discussion of governmental affairs' is
53
an informed one."
B.

Access to Administrative Proceedings in the Third Circuit

The Third Circuit has stated that the history and logic analysis from
Richmond Newspapers is broadly applicable to issues involving access to administrative proceedings. 54 Indeed, the Third Circuit has observed that
49. Id. (explaining that judge holds authority to decide what information is
provided to the public and that allowing press in courtroom would stifle judge's
authority).
50. See id. at 1068 (applying history and logic prongs of Richmond Newspapers
to determine whether right of access attaches to civil trials).
51. See id. at 1069 (reviewing various legal authorities that confirmed the presumptive openness of civil trials).
52. See id. at 1070 (reasoning that public access to civil trials, no less than
criminal trials, safeguards fact-finding process, fosters appearance of fairness,
heightens public respect for judicial process and permits public to participate in
and serve as check on judicial process).
53. Id. The Third Circuit then found that the trial court's closure of the entire hearing, as opposed to only parts of it, was not a narrowly tailored means of
serving the judge's interest in closing the hearing. See id. at 1074 (concluding
judge's closure order failed strict scrutiny).
54. See, e.g., N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 208-09 (3d
Cir. 2002) (explaining that Richmond Newspapers right-of-access analysis applies
broadly to issues of access to governmental proceedings, including deportation
hearings, which occur in administrative context); Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Township of W. Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 180- 81 (3d Cir. 1999) (concluding right of
access to administrative proceedings exists if Richmond Newspapers test is satisfied);
Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1174 (3d Cir. 1986) (explaining that government may not exclude press or public from proceedings, criminal
or otherwise, if proceedings have historically been open to public and public access plays significant positive role in function of proceeding); First Amendment
Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467, 472 (3d Cir. 1986) (suggesting that if administrative proceedings to which press sought access had been
historically open to public, Third Circuit may have found right of access).
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certain administrative hearings "walk, talk, and squawk" very much like a
lawsuit. 55 Although the Third Circuit has conceived of a right of access to
administrative proceedings, it denied the press access in both cases in
56
which reporters asserted a right of access to administrative proceedings.
Despite these denials, one court pointed out that in both cases in which
the Third Circuit denied the press access, the issue was whether the press
had a right to view investigatory documents related to administrative proceedings, as distinguished from a right to attend adjudicatory hearings, the issue
57
involved in Richmond Newspapers and its progeny.
The first case in which the Third Circuit considered a right of access
in the administrative context was Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester.58 In
Capital Cities Media, a newspaper company called Times Leader sought access to documents of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources ("D.E.R.") relating to the D.E.R.'s investigation of contaminated
drinking water in several areas of Pennsylvania. 59 The Third Circuit denied the press access to the documents. 6 0 In doing so, the court distinguished between access to adjudicatory hearings and investigatory
documents and emphasized that the First Amendment bars the government from excluding the press from hearings, provided that the history
61
and logic prongs of the right-of-access analysis are met.
55. See N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 214 (citing Federal Maritime Commission v.
South Carolina State Ports Authority, 535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002), for proposition that
administrative proceedings' occurrence in Executive Branch context "cannot blind
us to the fact that the proceeding is truly an adjudication").
56. See Whiteland Woods, 193 F.3d at 181 (holding that plaintiff has right of
access to planning commission meetings, which are administrative, but finding individual's right of access not violated when township prevented individual from
videotaping meeting).
57. See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 699-700 (6th Cir. 2002)
(distinguishing investigatory nature of information sought in Capital Cities Media
and First Amendment Coalition from adjudicatory nature of INS hearing to which
court granted access).
58. See Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1166-69 (3d Cir.
1986) (applying Richmond Newspapers analysis to administrative proceeding and
characterizing issue as whether press had right of access to records of state environmental agency).
59. See id. at 1165-66 (stating facts). In December 1983, Pennsylvania Gas &
Water Company placed 250,000 customers on water use restrictions because of an
outbreak of an intestinal illness called giardiasis, which is caused by the contamination of drinking water. See id. (stating facts). Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources ("D.E.R.") is responsible for enforcing environmental laws
designed to protect the integrity of the public water supplies. See id. (same). The
Times Leader, a newspaper company, had investigated the causes of the giardiasis
outbreak, including D.E.R.'s possible responsibility. See id. (same). Times Leader
sought documents from D.E.R. regarding the results of D.E.R.'s investigation of
the giardiasis or sewer problems, but the D.E.R. officials denied the press access to
these documents. See id. (same).
60. See id. at 1175 (denying Times Leader access to proceeding).
61. See id. at 1174 ("[W]e do not yet know whether the Supreme Court will
apply its analysis of access in the context of judicial proceedings to the context of
executive branch files."). The court acknowledged that the Free Speech and Press
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Additional evidence that the Third Circuit recognizes a right of access
to administrative hearings can be found in First Amendment Coalitionv. Judicial Inquiry & Review Board.62 In FirstAmendment Coalition, members of the

media unsuccessfully sought access to the record of private board hearings
involving judicial misconduct charges against Associate Justice Larsen of
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 63 The Third Circuit assumed that the

press had a right of access to the record of private board hearings, which
were administrative hearings. 64 The court nevertheless ruled that the
state's competing interest in protecting its judiciary from frivolous claims
of misconduct trumped the right of access in that instance. 65 As the court
interest than
emphasized, "[t] here could hardly be a higher governmental
66
a State's interest in the [integrity] of its judiciary."
Clauses bar the government from closing governmental hearings, provided the history and logic prongs are met. See id. at 1168 (explaining that Free Speech Clause
prohibits government from closing governmental proceedings, whether judicial or
otherwise, if proceedings satisfy history and logic prongs of Richmond Newspapers
test). With respect to papers, however, the court held that it would strain the text
of the First Amendment to interpret it as conferring on each citizen a presumptive
right of access to any government-held documents that may be of interest to a
particular citizen. See id. at 1168 (explaining such interpretation would be unreasonable). The court ultimately upheld the district court's dismissal of the Times
Leader's claim on grounds that Time Leaderfailed to allege a tradition of access. See
id. at 11175 (requiring plaintiffs seeking access to particular proceedings to allege
history of access, pursuant to first prong of Richmond Newspapers analysis).
62. 784 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1986). Pennsylvania's Constitution created a Judicial Inquiry and Review Board to oversee the conduct of the state's judiciary. See
id. at 468-69 (stating facts). The Board receives complaints of improper judicial
conduct, conducts investigations and, after examining the complaint, the Board
may order a hearing and direct the attendance and testimony of witnesses. See id.
(same). If the Board finds good cause after its hearing, it recommends to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court suspension, removal, discipline or compulsory retirement of the justice or judge. See id. at 471 (same). All documents filed with the
Board and the records of the Board's hearings are to be kept confidential, except
in one instance: if the Board recommends that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
discipline a judge, the Board must file a transcript of its formal proceedings with
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in which case the press and public may view the
transcript. See id. (same).
63. See id. at 469-70 (stating facts). The plaintiffs were reporters from the
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette and PhiladelphiaInquirerand the First Amendment Coalition,
a nonprofit corporation made up of various media organizations. See id. (same).
64. See id. at 472 (assuming right of access to judicial disciplinary proceedings
and stating issue determining what stage in proceedings right of access attaches).
65. See id. at 476 (emphasizing unique nature ofJudicial Review Board's function of examiningjudicial misconduct and warning that eliminating confidentiality
requirement of hearings on judicial misconduct would expose state judges to harassment and disrupt judicial system). Applying the Richmond Newspapers test, the
Third Circuit denied the press access to the record of the Board's hearing because
the press failed to establish a history of openness and that public access played a
positive role in the Board's proceeding. See id. at 469-70 (explaining Board did not
recommend that Larsen be disciplined for alleged misconduct and, consequently,
record of hearings must remained sealed pursuant Pennsylvania Constitution).
66. Id. at 475 n.4 (quoting Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S.
829, 848 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring). The Third Circuit similarly assumed a
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QUESTION OF FIRST IMPRESSION: DOES THE
AcCESS TO

INS

PREss

HAVE A RIGHT OF

DEPORTATION HEARINGS?

Against this backdrop of cases defining and applying the right of access to adjudicatory hearings, courts have recently been called upon to
examine the right of access in the context of an INS deportation hearing
involving resident aliens who might be connected to al Qaeda or have
information regarding the September 11, 2001 attacks. 67 Only two circuits, the Third and the Sixth, have decided the issue, and they reached
different conclusions after ruling on virtually identical facts. 68 To better
illustrate the reasoning underlying the Third Circuit's approach, it will be
69
contrasted with the Sixth Circuit's approach.
A.

Access to DeportationHearings Generally

The first immigration act dealing with deportation proceedings was
enacted in 1882.70 Since then, the governing statutes have always expressly provided for closed exclusion hearings, but they have never called
for closed deportation hearings. 7 1 Congress made this distinction because
due process rights attach to proceedings to deport an alien but not to
right of access in the administrative context in Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Township of
West Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 1999). Whiteland Woods applied the Richmond
Newspapers analysis to determine whether a real estate developer had a right to
videotape a township planning commission meeting. See id. at 180-81 (stating
"[w] e have no hesitation in holding Whiteland Woods had a constitutional right of
access to the ... meeting" because public access to commission's meetings passes
both prongs of Richmond Newspapers test). Although the Whiteland Woods court assumed the developer had right of access to attend the meetings, the court found
this was not significantly curtailed by the ban on videotaping. See id. at 183 (explaining right of access was not meaningfully restricted by Township's prohibition
on videotaping).
67. For further discussion of a fight of access to special interest deportation
proceedings, see infra notes 68-128 and accompanying text.
68. Compare N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 221 (3d
Cir. 2002) (denying press access to special interest hearings), with Detroit Free
Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (granting press access to special
interest hearings). For further discussion of the Sixth and Third Circuits' contrasting approaches to the right of access to special interest deportation hearings, see
infra notes 83-128 and accompanying text.
69. For a critical analysis of the Third Circuit's approach to the right of access
in special interest deportation hearings, see infra notes 98-128 and accompanying
text.
70. See Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214 (giving Congress duty to
regulate immigration); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 761 (1972) (noting
Congress passed first general immigration statute in 1882).
71. See N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 211 (recognizing that Congress has repeatedly reenacted statutes that close exclusion hearings, but has repeatedly reenacted
statutes governing deportation hearings without requiring that they be closed to
public). Exclusion proceedings take place when a foreigner seeks entry into the
United States, and a deportation proceeding occurs when the United States seeks
to deport a person who has already entered the United States. See id. at 212 n.8
(distinguishing exclusion and deportation proceedings). Despite their substantive
and procedural differences, exclusion and deportation hearings are currently
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proceedings considering whether to grant an alien entry into the United
States. 72 Since 1965, INS regulations have expressly stated that deporta73
tion proceedings are to be presumptively open to the press and public.
Under the statute, however, an immigration judge may limit or prohibit
attendance to deportation proceedings in four circumstances: (1) if the
physical facility in which the hearing will be conducted cannot accommodate the number in attendance, in which case priority is given to the press
or the public; (2) if the purpose of closure is to protect witnesses, parties
or the public interest; (3) if the hearing involves an abused alien spouse or
child; or (4) if the hearing considers information subject to a protective
order due to a substantial likelihood that the information, if disclosed,
74
would harm national security interests of the United States.
B.

"Special Interest" Deportation Hearings and the Creppy Directive

Shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks, President George Bush
ordered an investigation of the attacks and related terrorist threats to the
United States. 75 This investigation made the government aware of aliens
who had violated immigration laws and were therefore subject to removal
from the United States. 7 6 Attorney General John Ashcroft authorized the
Office of the Chief Immigration Judge to outline additional security pro77
cedures to apply in deportation cases designated as special interest cases.
Special interest cases are those involving aliens who "might have conneccalled "removal" hearings. See id. (citing Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 394
n.4 (3d Cir. 1999)).
72. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)
("[Although] it is true that aliens who have once passed through our gates, even
illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law .... [a]n alien on the threshold of initial entry stands on different footing.").
73. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.27 (2003) (providing for open deportation hearings since
1965 except in limited circumstances).
74. See id. (noting four exceptions to openness of deportation hearings).
75. See Homeland Security Presidential Directive 2 (Oct. 30, 2001), at 2001
WL 1329414 (outlining initiatives to combat terrorism through immigration policies); see also The Terrorist Threat Confronting the United States, Before the Senate Comm.
on Intelligence, 107th Cong. (Sept. 26, 2002) (statement for the record of Dale L.
Watson, Executive Assistant Director, Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence,
Federal Bureau of Investigation), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/
2002_hr/020602watson.html (stressing that after September 11, 2001, terrorism
matters are number one priority of FBI).
76. See Matthew Brzezinski, Hady Hassan Omar's Detention, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27,
2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 50 (indicating that government's massive anti-terrorism
efforts following September 11, 2001 attacks led to the U.S. government deporting
more than 400 people after conducting their deportation hearings in secret).
77. See Protective Orders in Immigration Administrative Proceedings, 67 Fed.
Reg. 36799 (May 28, 2002) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt.3), available at 2002 WL
1048864 (F.R.) (authorizing immigration judges to close proceedings to public if
information to be considered would, if disclosed, present substantial likelihood of
harm to national security). Attorney General Ashcroft has authority over all laws
relating to the administration and enforcement of all laws relating to the immigra-
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tions with, or possess information pertaining to" the September 11, 2001
attacks, al Qaeda or related terrorist groups. 78 Pursuant to a memoran-

dum issued by Chief Immigration Judge Creppy (the "Creppy Directive"),
all special interest cases are conducted in secret, sealed from all visitors,
79
press and even the detainee's family members.
Several media companies challenged the Creppy Directive's policy of
closing these hearings as violating their First Amendment right to attend
and sought injunctions to enjoin closing of the hearings. 80 In each case,
the government countered these challenges with assertions that any right
to attend is defeated by the government's national security interest in conducting special interest hearings in secret. 8 ' More precisely, the government sought to avoid disclosing potentially harmful information to
terrorists who might pose an ongoing security threat to the United
82
States.
tion and naturalization of aliens. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1103 (West 2003) (summarizing
powers of Attorney General).
78. Memorandum from Michael Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge (Nov. 20,
2001, 12:58AM) [hereinafter Creppy Directive] (on file with author), available at
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/pdf/immigctpro.pdf.
79. See id. ("The courtroom must be closed for [special interest] cases-no
visitors, no family, and no press."). The Creppy Directive ordered other heightened security measures, including a requirement that special interest cases be assigned only tojudges who hold at least secret clearance and a requirement that the
judges instruct all courtroom personnel not to discuss the cases with anyone because many of the cases involve classified evidence. See id. (enumerating heightened security procedures for special interest cases).
80. See N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 221 (3d Cir.
2002) (presenting newspaper company's First Amendment challenges to closing of
deportation hearings); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002)
(same).
81. See Brief for Appellant at 7-8, 20-21, 37, N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v.
Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002) (No. 02-2524) (contending that considerations leading Richmond Newspapers Court to create right of access to criminal trials
do not apply to administrative proceedings, including deportation proceedings,
and emphasizing that closure of special interest cases is necessary to protect national security by safeguarding government's investigation of September 1 th terrorist attacks and other terrorist conspiracies); Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 705-06
(same).
82. See Appellant's Brief at 7-8, N. Jersey Media (No. 02-2524) (urging court to
seal special interest cases from public). The Government supported its national
security conclusion with an affidavit by James S. Reynolds, Chief of the Terrorism
and Violent Crimes Section of the Justice Department's Criminal Division, which
provided several reasons for closure:
1. "[D]isclosing the names of 'special interest' detainees ... could
lead to public identification of individuals associated with them, other
investigative sources, and potential witnesses ... [and t]errorist organizations ... could subject them to intimidation or harm ......
2. "[D]ivulging the detainees' identities may deter them from cooperating... [and] terrorist organizations with whom they have connection may refuse to deal further with them . . ." thereby eliminating
valuable sources of information for the Government and impairing its
ability to infiltrate terrorist organizations.
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Sixth Circuit's Approach

In Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft,8 3 the Sixth Circuit upheld an injunction, prohibiting the INS from closing the deportation hearing of Rabih
Haddad, a special interest detainee.8 4 The court applied the two-prong
Richmond Newspapers analysis and concluded the Creppy Directive's mandated closure policy violated the press's First Amendment right to attend
the hearings. 85 The Sixth Circuit applied the Richmond Newspapers analysis
as a sliding scale test in the sense that a lack of long history of openness is
not fatal to the press's right of access.8 6 Rather, a brief tradition of openness suffices to establish a right of access where access plays a significant
8 7
positive role in the functioning of the proceeding.
Despite finding that a strong justification for openness can make up
for a lack of openness throughout history, the court concluded that deportation hearings had been open to the public for sufficiently long to satisfy
the Richmond Newspaper's history prong.8 8 The court examined the statutes governing deportation hearings and determined that Congress's explicit closure of exclusion hearings, while not providing for closure of
deportation hearings, constituted roughly a 120-year history of presump3. "[R]eleasing the names of the detainees ... would reveal the
direction and progress of the investigation..." and "[o] fficial verification
that a member [of a terrorist organization] has been detained and therefore can no longer carry out the plans of his terrorist organization may
enable the organization to find a substitute who can achieve its
goals .... "
4. "[P]ublic release of names, and place and date of arrest ...
could allow terrorist organizations and others to interfere with the pending proceedings by creating false or misleading evidence."
5. "[T]he closure directive is justified by the need to avoid stigmatizing 'special interest' detainees, who may ultimately be found to have no
connection to terrorism ... "
Id.; see also Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d 681, 705-06 (quoting Detroit Free Press v.
Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 947 (E.D. Mich. 2002)).
83. 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
84. See id. at 683 (affirming district court's order enjoining blanket closure of
deportation hearings in special interest cases).
85. See id. at 694, 710 (applying history and logic test to claim of access to
deportation hearings and concluding Creppy Directive is not narrowly tailored to
achieve its compelling interest). The Sixth Circuit referred to the Supreme
Court's opinion in FederalMaritime Commission v. South CarolinaPorts Authority, 122
S. Ct. 1864 (2002), to justify applying the Richmond Newspapers analysis to administrative proceedings. See id. at 697 (citing Federal Maritime, 122 S. Ct. at 1873 for
proposition that administrative proceedings "walk, talk, and squawk" very much
like lawsuits).
86. See id. at 701 (explaining that "a brief historical tradition [of openness]
might be sufficient to establish a First Amendment right of access where the beneficial effects of access to that process are overwhelming and uncontradicted").
87. See id. (emphasizing consistency of Sixth Circuit's sliding scale test with
Supreme Court's view that First Amendment should be construed broadly so as to
apply to contexts that did not exist in Framers' time).
88. See id. at 701 (explaining general policy of deportation hearings as one of
historical openness).
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tively open deportation hearings. 89 The court also found that public access plays a significant positive role in deportation proceedings and, thus,
the logic prong of the test was satisfied. 90
Having concluded that access to deportation hearings satisfied the
history and logic analysis and is therefore a right, the Sixth Circuit strictly
scrutinized the Creppy Directive's blanket closure order. 9 1 In applying
strict scrutiny, the court recognized that the government's interest in national security is clearly compelling. 92 The court concluded, however,
that, for three reasons, the Creppy Directive's blanket closure policy was
not narrowly tailored to serve the national security interest.93 First, the
Creppy Directive ignored Supreme Court precedent by ordering per se
closure for all special interest hearings without requiring the immigration
judge to make particularized findings as to why access to each particular
case would threaten national security. 94 Second, the government had a
less restrictive alternative to blanket closure-closure on a case-by-case ba89. See id. at 701-02 (endorsing rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which
suggests that Congress's practice of closing exclusion hearings while failing to
close deportation hearings leads one to infer Congress intended deportation hearings to be open).
90. See id. at 703-04 (noting that all justifications for openness expressed in
Richmond Newspapers and its progeny applied to open deportation hearings). The
Sixth Circuit emphasized that open deportation hearings would serve to pacify
community outrage over September l1th devastations. See id. at 704 ("[T]he cathartic effect of open deportations [after September 11] cannot be overstated.").
91. See id. at 705 (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 60607 (1982), for proposition that government must support action that infringes
right of access with showing that closure of proceeding "is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest").
92. See id. at 705 (accepting government's terrorist investigation as compelling interest in closing special interest hearings).
93. For a further discussion of why the Sixth Circuit determined the Creppy
Directive was not narrowly tailored to serve a government interest in national security, see infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
94. See Creppy Directive, supra note 78 (requiring blanket closure of special
interest deportation hearings); cf. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457
U.S. 596, 609 n.20 (1982) ("Indeed, the plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers
suggested that individualized determinations are always required before the right
of access may be denied: 'Absent an overriding interest articulated in findings, the
trial of a criminal case must be open to the public."' (emphasis added)); see also
Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 707 (discussing government's failure to heed Supreme
Court's requirement that if judge is to close hearing, judge must make specific
findings on record to allow reviewing court to determine whether closure was
proper and whether judge had less restrictive alternatives). The government asserted that it was unable to determine on a case-by-case basis which deportation
cases should be closed to the public. See id. at 692-93 (asserting fear that terrorists
could acquire dangerous information if hearings are open to public). For an analogous situation in which the government argued it was incapable of individualized
determinations, see Korematsu v. United States. 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (accepting
government's finding that it was impossible to separate disloyal Japanese from
loyal and therefore exclusion of entire group from California coast was necessary).
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sis. 9 5 Third, the Creppy Directive did not prevent terrorists from obtaining sensitive information because the deportees themselves (and their
96
lawyers) could discuss the proceedings with the press after the hearings.
The Sixth Circuit buttressed its decision to grant the press access with an
eloquent statement about preserving rights in both good and bad times:
[T]he events of September 11, 2001, left an indelible mark on
our nation, but we as a people are united in the wake of the destruction to demonstrate to the world that we are a country
deeply committed to preserving the rights and freedoms guaranteed by our democracy. Today, we reflect our commitment to
those democratic values by ensuring that our government is held
accountable to the people and that First Amendment rights are
not impermissibly compromised. Open proceedings, with a vigorous and scrutinizing press, serve to ensure the durability of our
97
democracy.

2.

Third Circuit's Approach

In North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 98 the Third Circuit reversed a district court's nationwide injunction that enjoined the Creppy
99
Directive's blanket closure of all special interest deportation hearings.
The Third Circuit agreed that the Richmond Newspapers analysis applied to
deportation hearings, but it applied the analysis differently than did the
Sixth Circuit. 0 0 In applying the history and logic prongs of the test, the
Third Circuit ruled that the press does not have a right of access to depor95. See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 707 (asserting case-by-case closure of hearings is as effective as blanket closure in preserving national security).
96. See id. (noting that blanket closure of hearings does not necessarily protect national security because deportees themselves can discuss proceedings and
disclose documents to friends, family and press).
97. Id. at 711.
98. 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).
99. See id. at 202 (reversing district court's holding that Richmond Newspapers
history and logic test renders Creppy Directive unconstitutional). Perhaps the
only important difference between Detroit Free Press and NorthJersey Media is that in
the former case the press sought an injunction enjoining closure of one individual's hearing, whereas in the latter case the press sought a nationwide injunction on
enforcement of the Creppy Directive's closure order. For further discussion of the
significance of difference in remedies sought in North Jersey Media and Detroit Free
Press, see infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
100. See N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 208-09 (instructing that Richmond Newspapers analysis applies to administrative proceedings); see also United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 839 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Press-Enter.Co. v. Superior Court (PressEnter. 1!), 478 U.S. 1, 7 (1986), for proposition that that "the First Amendment
question cannot be resolved solely on the label we give the event, i.e., 'trial' or
otherwise"); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enter. I), 464 U.S. 501, 516
(1984) (Stevens,J., concurring) ("[T]he distinction between trials and other official proceedings is not necessarily dispositive, or even important, in evaluating the
First Amendment issues.").
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tation proceedings.' 0 ' The Third Circuit's analysis did not function as a
sliding scale. 10 2 Rather, the history prong itself determined whether a
right of access existed, and a lack of historical access to the proceeding was
fatal to the asserted right of access, regardless of whether the logic prong
03

was met. 1

Under the Third Circuit's analysis, the relatively short history of access to deportation proceedings does not satisfy the history prong for several reasons.10 4 First, according to the Third Circuit, Congress's failure to
close deportation proceedings to the press or public, while never guaranteeing their openness, is not the kind of uncontradicted history required
by Richmond Newspapers.'0 5 Second, whatever tradition of openness deportation hearings have, it has only existed since the 1890s, as opposed to the
history of public access to criminal trials involved in Richmond Newspapers,
10 6
Third, despite the
dating back to a time before the Norman Conquest.
1964 INS regulations stating that deportation hearings shall be open except in limited circumstances, the exceptions to presumptive openness are

101. See N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 220 (concluding press has no right of
access to special interest deportation proceedings).
102. See id. at 216 (explaining that even if public access to proceedings plays
substantial positive role in function of proceeding, lack of history of openness is
fattal to claims of access).
103. See id. at 214 (declaring that Third Circuit will not find right of access
without strong historical evidence that proceeding in question has historically
been open to press and public). In regard to the logic prong, the Third Circuit
stated, "we are troubled by our sense that the logic inquiry, as currently conducted,
does not do much work in the Richmond Newspapers test." See id. at 217 (revealing
there is no case in which proceeding passed experience prong through its history
of openness yet failed logic prong by not serving community values). Therefore, it
is of little consequence to the Third Circuit that public access to special interest
deportation hearings furthers each of the following six values, which the Third
Circuit previously stated are typically served by openness of proceedings: (1) promoting informed discussion of governmental affairs by helping the public understand the judicial system; (2) enriching the public's perception of fairness which
can be achieved only by allowing the public to view the proceedings; (3) providing
the community with an outlet for community outrage, hostility and emotion; (4)
serving as a check on arbitrary and impartial judicial practices; (5) ensuring fairness to all involved in the proceeding; and (6) discouraging perjury. See id. (citing
United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 839 (3d Cir. 1999), for proposition that Third
Circuit has gleaned sixjustifications for public access to adjudicatory proceedings).
104. For a discussion of why the Third Circuit does not find a history of open
deportation proceedings sufficient to satisfy Richmond Newspapers analysis, see infra
notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
105. See N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 213 (acknowledging strength of expressio
unius argument, but refusing to find right of access to deportation proceedings
simply because Congress has failed to close deportation hearings despite numerous opportunities to do so).
106. See id. (suggesting that deportation hearings do not have tradition of
openness tantamount to centuries-long tradition of openness present in civil and
criminal trial contexts).
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not evidence of "unbroken, uncontradicted history" of public access re07
quired by Richmond Newspapers.'

In its application of the logic prong, the Third Circuit departed from
Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedent, which asks only whether
public access to the proceeding in question plays a significant positive role
in the functioning of the proceeding.' 0 8 The Third Circuit considered
the positive role of access to the proceeding. Afterward, however, the
court created an entirely new inquiry, asking whether a competing public
interest weighs against openness. 10 9 As the court stated in North Jersey Media, an inquiry into the positive role public access plays "must perforce
take account of the flip side-the extent to which openness impairs the
public good."110
In applying its refined logic prong, the Third Circuit concluded that
each of the justifications pronounced in Richmond Newspapers was present,
but "we are [nevertheless] troubled by our sense that the logic inquiry...
does not do much work in the Richmond Newspapers test."III Therefore,
107. See id. (indicating that although in 1964 Department of Justice ("DOJ")
regulations created presumptive right of access to deportation proceedings, "recent-and rebuttable-regulatory presumption is hardly the stuff of which Constitutional rights are forged."). Richmond Newspapers and its progeny provide little
guidance for determining how much of a history of access satisfies the history
prong. The shortest history of access to satisfy the history prong is 196 years. See
Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enter. II), 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986) (citing
United States v. Burr, 25 F.Cas. 1 (No. 14,692) (CC Va. 1807), as example of 196
year-old case in which preliminary hearing was conducted before public and
press). One commentator suggests the Court has not provided that a specific
quantity of history satisfies the history prong because the historical analysis is not
critically important. See Recent Case, First Amendment-Public Access to Deportation
Hearings-ThirdCircuit Holds That the Government Can Close "SpecialInterest" Deportation Hearings, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1193, 1198 (2003) (positing thatJustice Brennan's
precedential concurrence in Richmond Newspapers suggests historical analysis is subsidiary to logic prong of two-part analysis and that analysis of proceedings' history
of openness must be mindful of justifications for that history).
108. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enter. II), 478 U.S. 1, 8
(1986) (instructing that logic prong requires courts to consider "whether public
access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process
in question"); Press Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enter. I), 464 U.S. 501, 508
(1984) (same); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982)
(same); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) (same).
109. See N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 217 n.13 (blurring distinction between
application of logic prong and application of strict scrutiny, which comes only after
right of access is found). The Third Circuit recognized that "under our approach,
there is an evidentiary overlap between the Richmond Newspapers logic prong and
the subsequent 'compelling government interest' strict scrutiny investigation necessary upon a finding of a First Amendment access right." Id. The Court instructed, however, that the two inquiries are "not redundant because it is possible
for openness to serve a positive role under a balanced logic prong even though the
government has a compelling interest in closure." Id.
110. Id. at 217.
111. Id. The Third Circuit's conclusion that the logic prong carries little
weight in the Richmond Newspaper analysis contradicts the Third Circuit's previous
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the court concluded the press had no right of access to special interest
deportation hearings. 112 Having found no First Amendment right of access to the deportation proceedings, the Third Circuit did not apply strict
scrutiny to the Creppy Directive.'1 3.

Contrastingthe Sixth and Third Circuit Approaches

The Sixth and Third Circuit approaches to determining whether the
press has a right of access to special interest deportation hearings differ in
judgments regarding the importance of the logic prong. See Capital Cities Media,
Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1177 (3d Cir. 2002) (Adams, J., concurring) (emphasizing critical role of logic prong in Richmond Newspapers analysis). As Justice
Adams noted in Capital Cities Media,
Whether access to a particular proceeding would encourage the dissemination of information and discussion beneficial to our society is a critical
issue in determining whether the Constitution requires public access....
One could envision a special case, perhaps, where access to governmental
proceedings might be deemed so significant to a democratic government
that the First Amendment would mandate access even without a showing
of a tradition of openness.
Id.; see also United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 838 (3d Cir. 1994) (concluding
that where historical analysis provides little guidance to whether right of access
should attach to proceedings, the Court "will rely primarily on the 'logic' prong of
the test"); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 555 (3d Cir. 1982) (relying exclusively on logic prong and expressly ignoring history prong in determining that
press has right of access to pretrial criminal proceedings).
112. See N.Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 204-05 (holding "there is no First Amendment right to attend [special interest] deportation proceedings").
113. See id. at 221 (finding no need to strictly scrutinize Creppy Directive's
blanket closure policy after concluding media has no First Amendment right of
access to special interest deportation proceedings). The court's subsequent dicta
nevertheless sought to refute any arguments that excluding the media from hearings does not effectuate the government's interest in national security. See id. at
204 (addressing media's argument that Creppy Directive's "veil of secrecy is ineffective at best" in protecting national security because it permits detainees themselves to disclose information about their proceedings). A recently promulgated
regulation buttresses the Third Circuit's position that the Creppy Directive effectively preserves dangerous information from leaking to terrorists. See Protective
Orders in Immigration Administrative Proceedings, 67 Fed. Reg. 36799 (May 28,
2002) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3) (authorizing immigration judges to issue
protective orders and seal records as necessary to prevent detainees and their attorneys from disclosing information, which, if disclosed, may be harmful to national
security).

Additionally, the Third Circuit rejected the feasibility of a case-by-case closure
because the disclosure of even the detainees' identities could reveal the government's investigatory patterns. See N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 219 (accepting statement of Dale Watson that "given judges' relative lack of expertise regarding
national security and their inability to see the mosaic, we should not entrust to
them the decision whether an isolated fact is sensitive enough to warrant closure").
The Third Circuit doubted immigration judges' ability to reliably protect information that is seemingly innocuous, but potentially dangerous if combined with other
information regarding details of the government's terrorism investigations. See id.
at 200 (declining to expect immigration judges to be able to accurately assess harm
that might result from disclosing "seemingly trivial facts").

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003

21

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 5 [2003], Art. 2
1324

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48: p. 1303

several respects.' 14 On a broad level, the press is more likely to have rightof-access under the Sixth Circuit's application of the Richmond Newspapers
test.1 5 The Sixth Circuit's approach is more lenient to the press because
it uses a sliding scale test.' 6 In contrast, the Third Circuit rigidly applies
each prong of the Richmond Newspapers test.' 1

7

Additionally, the critical

question under the Sixth Circuit's approach is whether public access to
the hearing will enhance its finctioning. ''8 If access enhances the hearing's functioning, the Sixth Circuit will be heavily inclined to grant the
press access, even if the public and press have not historically been
granted access to the hearing in question. 1 9 In contrast, the Third Circuit will not grant the press access to a hearing unless that type of hearing
has a long history of being open to the press and public, regardless of
whether public access enhances the functioning of the hearing. 1

114. For further discussion of the differences in Sixth and Third Circuit approaches, see infra notes 115-28 and accompanying text.
115. Compare Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 701 (6th Cir. 2002)
(construing logic prong of Richmond Newspapers analysis as more important consideration than history prong), with N.Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 212-14, 217 (requiring
unbroken and uncontradicted history of openness, regardless of whether access to
hearing in question plays positive role in functioning of hearing).
116. See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 701 ("[A]lthough historical context is
important, a brief historical tradition might be sufficient to establish a First
Amendment right of access where the beneficial effects of access to that process
are overwhelming and tincontradicted.").
117. See N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 213-14 (refusing to grant press access to
proceeding in question where history of access to proceeding is ambiguous or lacking and inquiring into negative as well as positive role access plays in proceeding).
118. See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 703 (recognizing function of public access in deportation context is to enhance quality of proceedings). The Sixth Circuit emphasizes the importance of public access to hearings in immigration
context in which government has "nearly unlimited authority" because press and
public are the only check on the government. See id. at 704 (quoting Richmond
Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980) for aphorism that states, "without
publicity, all other checks [on government] are insufficient"). Public access to
deportation hearings may act as a substantially important check on the government in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath. 339
U.S. 33, 46, 50 (1950) (requiring government to afford due process before deporting aliens and depicting context of deportation hearing as involving "voteless class
of litigants" who are "strangers to the laws and customs [of the United States] ...
and often do not even understand the tongue in which they are accused").
119. See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 703-05 (enumerating justifications weighing heavily in favor of public access to hearing, such as public access ensuring
fairness of deportation hearings; having therapeutic effect for community after
September 11, 2001 attacks; enhancing society's respect for government; and ensuring that citizens can participate in our republican system of self-government).
120. See N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 216 (explaining Third Circuit's approach
as rejecting right of access to hearing in question if hearing does not have unbroken and uncontradicted tradition of openness, irrespective of whether public access has beneficial effect on function of hearing).
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The Sixth Circuit's approach is more in line with Supreme Court precedent than is the Third Circuit's.' 2 1 Specifically, Richmond Newspapers
and its progeny applied the two-prong analysis as a sliding scale, giving
particular weight to the logic prong.' 22 Indeed, this was the Third Circuit's approach prior to deciding the issue of media access to special interest deportation hearings. 12 3 The Third Circuit altered the way it applied
the Richmond Newspapers analysis in North Jersey Media. 124 Why the Third
Circuit departed from the Supreme Court's and the Third Circuit's traditional right-of-access approach is unclear.
One possible justification for the change in approach is the broad
scope of the remedy sought by the press in NorthJersey Media.12 5 Unlike in
Detroit Free Press, where the press sought an injunction enjoining the closure of one individual's deportation hearing, the press in North Jersey Media
sought a nationwide injunction on enforcement of the Creppy Directive's
closure order.' 26 The Third and Sixth Circuits neither articulated the significance of this difference nor the extent to which the remedy sought
impacted their respective approaches. 127 Nevertheless, the following
statement by the Third Circuit reflects its concerns about a nationwide
injunction on closure of all deportation hearings:
121. For a discussion of why the Sixth Circuit's right-of-access approach is particularly in line with Supreme Court precedent on the issue, see infra note 122 and
accompanying text.
122. See Press-Enter. v. Superior Court (Press-Enter. II), 478 U.S. 1, 11 n.3
(applying Richmond Newspapers as sliding scale test in that importance of public
access to proceeding could counterbalance brief history of openness); Recent
Case, supra note 107, at 1198 (indicating that underJustice Brennan's concurrence
in Richmond Newspapers, which has become prevailing approach to right-of-access
inquiries, most important question is whether access plays positive role in functioning of hearing because analysis of hearing's tradition of openness must be mindful
of justifications for that history).
123. See cases cited supra note 111 (identifying Third Circtit's traditional
right-of-access approach, under which Third Circuit accorded logic prong substantial weight in determining whether press has right to attend hearing in question).
124. See supra note 111 (indicating Third Circuit's departure from previous
applications of its right-of-access analysis).
125. See N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 204 (noting media sought nationwide injunction ordering all special interest deportation hearings to be open to press and
public).
126. Compare Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 684 (6th Cir. 2002)
(observing that press sought to enjoin closures of hearings in Haddad's case), with
N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 204 (observing that lower court's injunction was nationwide in scope).
127. See N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 204 (failing to articulate significance or
implications of media's requested remedy); Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 684
(same). Judge Scirica, who dissented from the Third Circuit's decision to deny the
media a right to attend special interest deportation hearings, briefly commented
on the broad scope of a nationwide injunction. See N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 228
(Scirica, J., dissenting) (suggesting benefits of remedy narrower than nationwide
injunction would be to provide relief to parties before court while allowing other
courts to examine difficult constitutional question of whether press has right to
attend special interest deportation hearings).
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We are keenly aware of the dangers presented by deference to
the executive branch when constitutional liberties are at stake,
especially in times of national crisis, when those liberties are
likely in greatest jeopardy. On balance, however, we are unable
to conclude that openness plays a positive role in special interest
deportation hearings at a time when our nation is faced with
128
threats of such profound and unknown dimension.

V.

CONCLUSION

The right of access is a fundamental right that the Supreme Court has
determined is implicit in the First Amendment's guarantees of free speech
and press. 129 The Supreme Court has acknowledged the press's right to
attend criminal trials and their various phases. 130 The Third Circuit extended that right to civil trials and has conceived of a right of access to
administrative hearings, indicating that such hearings "walk, talk, and
13 1
squawk like a civil lawsuit."
Litigators practicing in the Third Circuit need to be aware of the context in which a claim of access arises in order to effectively argue to the
Third Circuit that access to the proceeding in question does or does not
pass muster under the Richmond Newspapers analysis. 132 Regardless of the
context of the proceeding, practitioners need to make strong arguments
from history and precedent, given that the historical analysis is a critical
element of Third Circuit's approach to any right-of-access inquiry. 133 Furthermore, in disputing whether public access plays a positive role in the
proceeding in question (the logic prong), practitioners should consider
the countervailing interests that weigh against public access.' 34 If arguing
for access to special interest deportation hearings, litigators should liken
the hearing to a civil lawsuit, a context in which the Third Circuit has
128. N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 220.

129. For an introduction to the First Amendment right of access, see supra
notes 13-28 and accompanying text.
130. For a discussion of Supreme Court promulgations regarding the press's
right of access in the criminal context, see supra notes 13-43 and accompanying
text.
131. See N.Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 214 (quoting Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C.
State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002)). For a discussion of the Third Circuit's
recognition of a right of access to criminal, civil and administrative proceedings,
see supra notes 44-66 and accompanying text.
132. For an examination of the Third Circuit's application of the Richmond
Newspapers analysis in the criminal, civil and administrative contexts, see supra
notes 44-128 and accompanying text.
133. For a discussion of why the Third Circuit affords substantial weight to the
history prong of the Richmond Newspapers test, see supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
134. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's unique application of the Richmond Newspapers logic prong, see supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
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previously recognized a right of access. 135 Moreover, litigators should be
keenly aware of the Third Circuit's need to balance the constitutional liberties with national security as the nation endures the ongoing threat of
36
terrorism.1

Thomas V. Ayala

135. For a discussion of Third Circuit's recognition of the media's right to
attend civil trials, see supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
136. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's approach to the press's right of
access to special interest deportation hearings, see supra notes 98-113 and accompanying text.
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